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Donald G. Casswell*

Same-Sex Partners And Family
Class Immigration: Still Not Equal
With Opposite-Sex Partners

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which came into force in 2002, and
the Regulations under it, expanded family class immigration to include commonlaw partners and conjugal partners in addition to spouses A common-law partner
or a conjugal partner may be either an opposite-sex or same-sex partner-as
can a spouse, depending upon the currently evolving law with respect to samesex marriage. Under the former Immigration Act, same-sex partners had been
admitted pursuant to the discretion to admit immigrants on the basis of
compassionate or humanitarian considerations. After examining the admission
of same-sex partners under both the former and the current legislation, the author
argues that same-sex partners were, and still are, treated unequally in comparison
with opposite-sex partners. The only way to eliminate this sexual orientation
discrimination is to extend marriage to same-sex partners. In the meantime, the
government should facilitate the admission of same-sex partners unable to marry
outside Canada.

La Loi sur I'immigration et la protection des refugies, entree en vigueur en 2002,
et ses r~glements d'application, ont elargi /a catugorie -regroupement familial-,
pour y inclure les conjoints de fait et les partenaires comparables ' un conjoint,
en plus des conjoints Un conjoint de fait ou un partenaire comparable a un
conjoint peut 6tre un partenaire de sexe oppose ou un partenaire de m6me sexe,
en fonction de /'6volution actuelle du droit sur le manage entre personnes du
m~me sexe. Sous le regime de I'ancienne Loi sur I'immigration, les conjoints de
m~me sexe etaient admis grice J lexercice par les autorit~s de leur pouvoir
discrutionnaire d'admettre des immigrants pour des considerations d'ordre
humanitaire. Lauteur 6tudie Iadmission de conjoints de m6me sexe sous le regime
de I'ancienne Ioi et en vertu de la nouvelle, et arrive a Ia conclusion que les
partenaires de m~me sexe etaient et sont toujours trait6s de faion in6gale par
rapport aux partenaires de seve oppose. La seule fagon d'6liminer cette
discrimination fondee sur Iorientationsexuelle est de permettre le manage des
partenaires de m~me sexe. Entre temps, le gouvernement doit faciliter IPadmission
des partenaires de m~me sexe qui n 'ont pas Ia possibilite de se marier . Iext~rieur
du Canada.

* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
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Introduction
The Immigrationand Refugee ProtectionAct' (IRPA) and the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations2 (IRPRegs) came into force on June
28, 2002 and replaced the Immigration Act 3 ("the former Act") and the
Immigration Regulations, 1978' ("the former Regulations") respectively.
IRPA and the IRPRegs made many significant changes to Canadian immi-

gration and refugee law.' One of those changes was that a Canadian citizen
or permanent resident may now sponsor their "spouse", "common-law
partner" or "conjugal partner" as a family class immigrant, whereas only a
spouse could be sponsored under the former legislation. A common-law
partner or a conjugal partner may be either an opposite-sex partner or a
same-sex partner. The federal government stated that these changes to
immigration law would "ensure consistency with the [Canadian]Charter

I.

S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA].

2.

S.O.R./2002-227 [IRPRegs].

3.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2 [former Act].

4.
5.

S.O.R./78-172 [former Regulations].
A very useful source in this regard is Frank N. Marrocco and Henry M. Goslett, The 2004

Annotated Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada (Toronto. Carswell, 2003) at 1-5
(table of changes and amendments introduced by IRPA) and 99-104 (table of changes and amendments introduced by the IRPRegs).
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of Rights and Freedoms and the intent of the Modernization of Benefits
and Obligations .4ct."'
I begin by considering how spousal sponsorship was regulated under the
former Immigration Act and Regulations and how same-sex partners came
to be admitted to Canada, not as members of the family class, but pursuant
to the government's discretion to admit immigrants on the basis of
"compassionate or humanitarian considerations". In particular, I consider
the problems inherent in discretionary admission. I then examine samesex partner sponsorship under IRPA and the IRPRegs. Using a close analysis of what precisely the government intended to accomplish by adding
"common-law partner" and "conjugal partner" to the family class and what
in fact IRPA and the IRPRegs have done and the manner in which they are
applied by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), I argue that samesex partners are not in a substantially better situation now than they were
previously. Same-sex partners are still treated unequally in comparison to
opposite-sex partners and, therefore, lesbians and gay men are still treated
unequally with heterosexuals. I conclude by considering how equal treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex partnerships could be achieved, in
order that immigration law, both in its content and application, could truly
be "consisten[t] with the [Canadian] Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
the intent of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act."

I. Same-Sex Partners and the Former Immigration Act
1. Sponsoring a "Spouse"
Under the former Immigration Act and Regulations, a Canadian citizen or
permanent resident could sponsor their spouse as a family class immigrant.7 A person's "spouse" was defined as "the party of the opposite sex
to whom that person is joined in marriage'"' and "marriage" was defined as

Regulatorv ImpactAnalysis Statement, C. Gaz. 2002.1lExtra. 177 at 258, referring to the Cana6.
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act. 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,and the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C.

2000, c. 12.
Former Act, supra note 3, ss. 2(1) ("member of the family class"), 6(1), 6(2)(a); and former
7.
Regulations, supra note 4,ss 2(l) ("member of the family class"), 4-6(1).
8.
Former Regulations, ibid., s. 2(1). Interestingly, the former Regulations contained a second

definition of"spouse" of more limited application, namely, a citizen or permanent resident could cosponsor, with their "spouse," a family class immigrant, "spouse" for this purpose being extended to
include a cohabiting unmarried opposite-sex partner: former Regulations, s. 5(1). It would seem
clear that, after M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 171 D.L.R.(4th) 577, the "opportunity" afforded under

this provision for an unmarried opposite-sex partner to undertake an obligation to the federal government would have extended equally to a willing same-sex partner as well.
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"the matrimony recognized as a marriage by the laws of the country in
which it took place, but does not include any matrimony whereby one
party to that matrimony became at any given time the spouse of more than
one living person."'
2. Challenges to the Exclusionarv Definition of "'Spouse"
As has been argued elsewhere, the exclusion of same-sex partners from
the definition of "spouse" in the former Regulations undoubtedly constituted sexual orientation discrimination which violated the guarantee of
equality under section 15 of the Charterand, further, this violation would
0
not have been justified under section I of the Charter.1
In 1991, same-sex
couples, supported by the Lesbian and Gay Immigration Task Force
(LEGIT)," began to challenge the restrictive definition of "spouse". 2 The
federal government was reluctant to defend such challenges and litigate
the issue of same-sex partner sponsorship, likely because of a concern that
it might well lose, with the result that judicial precedent permitting samesex partner sponsorship would then exist. As a result, no court ever had the
opportunity of considering a constitutional challenge to the restrictive
definition of "spouse" in the former Regulations. Instead, the government
began issuing immigration visas to Canadian citizens' or permanent
residents' same-sex partners pursuant to its discretionary power to do so
for "compassionate or humanitarian considerations."
3. Admission of Same-Sex Partnersfor "Compassionateor
HumanitarianConsiderations"
Under the former ImmigrationAct and Regulations, the government could
exempt any person from any provision of the Act or Regulations or "otherNise facilitate the admission" of the person to Canada on the basis of "the
existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations."' 3 "Compas-

9.
Former Regulations, ibid., s. 2(l).
10. See Deborah McIntosh, "Defining 'Family'- A Comment on the Family Reunification Provisions in the Immigration Act" (1988) 3 JL. & Soc. Pol'y 104; Donald G. Casswell, Lesbians, Gay
i'en and Canadian Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1996) at 567-571; andAaron
A. Dhir, "Same-Sex Family Class Immigration: Isthe Definition of 'Spouse' in Canada's Immigration Regulations, 1978 Unconstitutional?" (2000) 49 U.N.B.L.J. 183.
I1. Online: LEGIT <www.legit.ca> [LEGIT].
12
Ibid. and Douglas Sanders, "Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights" (1994) 9:2 C.J.L.S. 99 at 124.
13
Former Ac, supra note 3, s. 114(2), and, from 1993, former Regulations, supra note 4, s.2.1
pursuant to SOR/93-44, s.2. While these provisions referred only to exemption from the Regulations, it had been held that they applied to both the Regulations and the Act: see Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) v Jiminez-Perez, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 565, 14 D.L.R.(4th) 609. Leading
examples of the judicial interpretation of these provisions included, Yhap v. Canada (Minister of
Emplovment and Immigration) (1990),9 Imm.L.R.(2d) 243 (EC.T.D.) [ Yhap]; Vidal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm.L.R.(2d) 123 (F.C.T.D.); and Baker v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 11999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker].
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sionate or humanitarian considerations" - generally referred to as "H&C"
- was interpreted as meaning "those facts, established by the evidence,
which would excite in a reasonable [person] in a civilized community a
desire to relieve the misfortunes of another."' 4
The federal go\ ernment first issued an immigration visa to a Canadian
citizen's same-sex partner in 1992, a few months after she and her partner
had commenced proceedings in the Federal Court challenging the constitutionality of the restrictive definition of "spouse" in the Regulations.5
However, the foreign national partner was granted permanent resident
status as an independent immigrant, not as a member of the family class.
Then, in 1994, C1C sent a fax to Canadian embassies and consulates
setting out guidelines for visa officers concerning visa applications
involving same-sex partners or unmarried opposite-sex partners. The fax
stated that in these cases visa applicants should be assessed under the
provisions governing independent immigrants and, if the applicant qualified as an independent immigrant. then an independent immigrant visa,
not a family class visa, should be issued. If the foreign national did not
qualify as an independent immigrant. then he or she should be considered
for possible admission under H&C. The fax stated in part:

2. ....[T]he treatment of same sex relationships under the immigration
regulations is coming under increasing scrutiny by public, media, courts

and interest groups. Likewise failure of immigration to recognize common
law relationships is increasingly being questioned.
3. The immigration regulations define spouse as someone of the opposite

sex to whom an individual is joined in marriage. Due to this definition,
[family class] sponsorship of same sex or common law spouse... is
conventionally precluded. These regulations remain law of the land unless
they are changed by government or struck down by courts.

6. ... [M]issions should review same sex or common law applications for
H&C grounds. Where H&C grounds are compelling it is appropriate for
program managers to ... authorize the issuance of an immigration visa.

14. Chirwa v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (lAB) at
350; and Chan v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm.L.R.(2d) 89

(I.R.B., A.D.) at 99-100. See generally Davies B.N. Bagambiire, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 1996) at 191-207, 312-318; and Donald Galloway,
Immigration Law (Concord, Ontario: Irwin Law, 1997) at 39-40, 140, 145, 204-209.
15. Casswell, supra note 10 at 569.
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H&C grounds in such cases include the existence of a stable relationship
with a Canadian citizen or permanent resident. Missions should recognize
that undue hardship would often result from separating or continuing the
separation of a bona fide same sex or common law couple.
7. When assessing whether H&C factors are present missions may, of
course, look behind same sex or common law relationships (as is done
with marriages of convenience). Missions should assess relationships to
determine that they are bona fide (in terms of duration and stability of
relationship) and not entered into primarily for the purpose of gaining
admission to Canada of one of the parties. Where H&C factors are present
and applicant is otherwise admissible missions should issue immigrant
visa."

Same-sex partners admitted on the basis of H&C considerations were also
issued independent immigrant visas rather than family class visas. CIC
later formalized this policy position by stating that "[t]he separation of
common-law or same sex partners who reside together in a genuine conjugal-like relationship is grounds for H&C consideration. As with all applications, cases involving common-law or same sex relationships must be
reviewed on their individual merit."' 7 With respect to determining whether
a relationship was bona fide, CIC instructed immigration officers to
consider in particular the level of interdependence between the partners.
Relevant evidence in this regard included, "[d]ocumentary evidence
pertaining to the relationship such as joint bank accounts, joint real estate
holdings, other joint property ownership, wills, insurance policies, letters
8
from friends and family.'
Pursuant to this government policy concerning admission of same-sex
partners for H&C considerations, many lesbian and gay Canadians were
able to bring their same-sex partners to Canada. 9 However, since samesex partners admitted on the basis of H&C considerations were admitted as
independent immigrants rather than family class immigrants, it is impossible to know how many same-sex partners were admitted to Canada. They
were effectively "buried" within statistics concerning independent
immigrants generally. While H&C admission of same-sex partners was
definitely a positive development, such admission was nevertheless

16. Da Silva v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] EC.J. No. 269 (T.D.),
182 FT.R. 58 at para. 4 [Da Silva].
17. Rodriguez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [20011 FC.J. No. 664 (I.D.)
at para. 6.
18. Ibid. at para. 7. See, also, Dhir, supra note 1O at 207-208; and Galloway, supra note 14 at 145.
19. Casswell, supra note 10 at 572.
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extremely problematic because of its discretionary nature. While detailed
consideration of the law concerning judicial review of the exercise of H&C
discretion is beyond the scope of this article, it is sufficient to say that
successfully challenging a negative decision on an application for discretionary admission wvas extremely difficult. 20 The only two reported cases
concerning H&C discretionary admission of a same-sex partner illustrate
the difficulties involved in such admission.
In da Silva v. Canada (.Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2 a
decision of the Federal Court, Trial Division, da Silva, a citizen of Brazil,
had been in Canada illegally since 1993 and was ordered in 1995 to leave
Canada when he abandoned his claim that he was a refugee. In November
1995, he met and began living vith a Canadian citizen. They lived together until sometime late in 1997, wvhen they separated, and then began
living together again in November 1999. In March 1997, da Silva applied
for an immigrant visa on two grounds, namely, as an independent applicant whose intended occupation NNas a cook and, second, on the basis of
his relationship Nvith his same-sex partner and H&C considerations. Da
Silva was interviewed by a visa officer on August 6, 1998 and his application was refused in a letter dated August 18, 1998. In her letter, the immigration officer stated that in her assessment da Silva did not qualify as a
cook. With respect to his H&C application, the entirety of her reasons for
decision on this point were, "I have considered possible humanitarian and
compassionate factors but have determined that there are insufficient
grounds to warrant special consideration. 2 2- As a result, a deportation order was issued against da Silva. He then applied to the Federal Court, Trial
Division, for a stay of the deportation order. An applicant seeking this
discretionary remedy must establish first, that there exists a serious issue
to be argued, secondly, that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the
remedy is not granted and, finally, that the balance of convenience favours
the granting of a stay. 23 In order for a stay to be granted, the applicant must
succeed on all three elements. With respect to the first element of the test
- whether there was a serious issue to be tried - da Silva argued that the
immigration officer's refusal letter indicated that she had given no consid-

20. See ibid. at 571-574; Dhir, supra note 10 at 208-212; and Wayne van der Meide, "Who Guards
the Borders of Canada's 'Gay' Community: A Case Study of the Benefits of the Proposed Redefinition of 'Spouse' Within the Immigration Act to Include Same-Sex Couples" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 39 at 41.
21. Supra note 16.
22. Ibid. at para. 7.
23. See Toth v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration) (1988), 6 lwf.L.R.(2d) 123,
86 N.R. 302 (FC.A.); and Bagambiire, supra note 14 at 167-173.
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eration to his H&C application. In his submission, this failure constituted
an infringement of his equality rights as guaranteed under section 15 of
the Charter. In his affidavit in support of his application, da Silva said that
the visa officer had showed little or no interest in the genuineness of his
relationship with his Canadian partner, had made few inquiries about it
and had cut him off when he tried to speak about it. The government
argued that the immigration officer had considered da Silva's H&C application and relied on her computer notes concerning her interview with da
Silva. Her notes stated in part:
Subj [Da Silva] claims he met his current partner, a Cdn citizen at a gym
in November 95. This appears to be at the same time subj was deemed
deport. He claims he met partner and has been living with him for approx
1.5 yrs. Although he moved in with partner he continued to work illegally
in Cda. Subj presented letters from friends attesting to character, honesty,
integrity. Very little in letters that focus on subj's relationship with partner
and any emotional hardship that would exist if subj left Cda. Subj was
asked about relationship with partner and application for landing. Subj
stated he would like to return to [B]razil to be able to visit family. He
would like to remain in Cda and go to school and work. Subj made no
comment regarding emotional dependency on partner. Stated he worked
illegally because partner is unable to support him and subj has own life
and feels it is important to work ...
Subj has shown a blatant disregard for the laws of Cda. When asked why
he did not leave Cda when ordered to do so subj stated he was afraid he
would not be able to return Cda if he left. No mention made of not wishing
to leave partner. I am unable to conclude there are H&C grounds in this
case. It appears subj entered into relationship and used it to aid in his
remaining in Cda. ...
Subj has not given me impression that hardship would
exist for him or partner if he left Cda. 4
Pelletier, J., as he then was, stated that he had "considerable misgivings
about the treatment which the application received" and that even the
immigration officer's computer notes "d[id] not show an attentive inquiry
into the issue" concerning the H&C application. 2 5 However, he determined
it was not necessary for him to decide this issue because, in his view,
da Silva had not established that he would suffer irreparable harm if a stay
of the deportation order was not granted and, therefore, his application

24.
25.

Da Silva, supra note 16 at para. 6.
Ibid at paras. 6, II.
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failed on the second element of the applicable test. In particular, Pelletier,
J. stated:
Documentary evidence was submitted that homophobic violence occurs
in Brazil, to wvhich the applicant is scheduled to be deported. On the other
hand, the applicant's affidavit recounts one incident of an assault against
him, following which he continued to live and work in Sao Paolo for
another four and one half years. Homophobic violence continues to occur
in Canada and the United States. If absolute safety were required, no illegal
claimant could e,,er be returned to his place of origin.
The applicant also claims that in the context of his relationship with his
partner, enforced separation would amount to undue hardship. This can
only be as true for same sex relationships as it is for conventional
relationships but ... the weight of authority in this court is that family
separation is not, of itself, undue hardship. In this case, the parties lived
apart for two years before resuming life together in November 1999. Their
voluntary separation colours the hardship associated [with] an involuntary
separation. 2'
In the result, therefore, da Silva's application for a stay of the deportation
order against him was dismissed.
The only other reported case in which an application for admission of
a same-sex partner on the basis of H&C was considered is the decision of
the Federal Court, Trial Division, in Rodriguez v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration).2' Rodriguez, a citizen of Cuba, had been in
Canada for eight years. Shortly after he arrived in Canada, he claimed
refugee status but that claim was rejected. Pre-removal risk assessments
had also been determined against him. He then applied for landing in Canada
under H&C on the basis that he was the same-sex partner of a Canadian
citizen. The immigration officer who considered his application decided
not to recommend discretionary admission on the basis of H&C. The immigration officer stated in her notes:
Involved in a same sex relationship and that he and his partner reside
together. Subject stated that he and his partner have been together for
approximately three years. Subject could not provide any evidence
pertaining to this relationship such as joint bank accounts, joint real estate,
joint ownership, wills, insurance policies, letters, bills or appartment [sic]

26.
27.

Ibid. at paras. 18-19.
Supra note 17.

212

The Dalhousie Law Journal

lease. Subject however after our interview opened a joint account with
his partner and sent us a copy of a statement. Subject did produce letters
from friends stating that the subject was in a relationship with John Freitas
a [C]anadian citizen ...
Overall, subject has not satisfied that there is a genuine relationship
between himself and John Freitas or that there is [sic] sufficient
humanitarian and compassionate grounds exist [sic] to warrant
[discretionary admission] ...
Subject stated that the hardship he would encounter if he were to return
home is emotionally he loves his partner and that they depend on each
other both emotionally and financiall,. Subject also stated that he will be
harased [sic] by the government and the police if he returns home due to
his sexual orientation. He went on to say that he has no home or
employment to return to and fears he xill be arrested for his political
opinion and desertion due to his employment with the [C]uban airlines
prior to coming to Canada. Subject's partner Nanted to add that the subject
is a valuable asset to Canada as he is self sufficient, has not been involved
in criminal activity, wkilling [sic] to help others and he loves him.
After careful consideration of the information provided by the subject
and his counsel, Iam not satisfied that the subject would face undue and
disproportionate hardship if returned to Cuba. Subject has been in Canada
for eight years. ... Subject has family residing in the U.S. and in Cuba. In
2
Canada, he has his partner John Freitas. 1
Rodriguez sought judicial review of the immigration officer's
decision, arguing that she had violated her duty of fairness by not advising
him adequately that she doubted the bona fides of his relationship with his
partner and not giving him an adequate opportunity to respond to her
concern, that she had disregarded the evidence of his establishment in
Canada, and that her decision was not reasonable based on the evidence
before her. McKeown, J. rejected all of these submissions and concluded
that the immigration officer had committed no reviewable error. With
respect to the submission that the immigration officer's decision was
unreasonable, the following is the entirety of McKeown, J.'s reasons:
[T]he standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter. However, on the
evidence before her, it was not unreasonable for the officer to conclude
that the Applicant had not satisfied her that there was a genuine relationship

28

Ibid at paras. I0, 11, 15.
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between himself and Mr. Freitas, and that there are insufficient
humanitarian and compassionate grounds to warrant [discretionary
admission]. -'

In the result, Rodriguez's application for judicial review was dismissed.
I do not knowN whether da Silva's relationship with his partner or
Rodriguez's relationship with his partner was genuine. Similarly, I do not
know whether they would have suffered undue hardship by being
separated from their partners. Conversely, however, I do not know whether
either da Silva or Rodriguez had the misfortune of being a victim of the
"subtle homophobia" ' which is possible in the immigration system in applying discretion. As one writer has put it, "[t]he fact that a 'humanitarian
and compassionate' immigration official may well be neither of those"
may present difficulties for lesbian and gay couples in seeking administrative largesse in a "highly discretionary and uncertain area of immigration
2
policy."-' Homophobia in immigration proceedings certainly has existed.
In particular, one cannot know x\ hether da Silva or Rodriguez had the
misfortune to have their applications assessed by an immigration officer
who harboured anti-homosexual prejudice. It is most unlikely that an
immigration officer would o ertl\ express such prejudice, as this would
expose their decision to judicial review for bias. However, I do submit
that some of the statements made by the immigration officers in these two
cases suggest a blissful ignorance on their part of the reality of living openly
and surviving as a same-sex couple in a frequently homophobic and
potentially violent society. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was
little, if any, documentary evidence by way of letters or otherwise,
especially from family, concerning their homosexual relationships. In the
context of another concern raised by the immigration officers in their cases,
perhaps they and their partners were not economically well off, and therefore had not yet had the chance to accumulate real estate, bank accounts
and other property together, even if that was a personal goal for them.
Again, I do not know. My point is simply to highlight the unfairness
inherent in the discretionary system da Silva and Rodriguez bumped head
first into. The individual immigration officer in such a process has huge

29. Ibid. at para. 19. The leading case with respect to the standard of review of an immigration
officer's decision on an H & C application is Baker, supra note 13.
30. Dhir, supra note 10 at 184.
31. McIntosh, supra note 10 at 110.
32. Casswell, supra note 10 at 590-602, referring specifically to concerns about the Immigration
and Refugee Board.
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discretion to make assumptions about the nature of a couple's relationship
which may in fact be utterly wrong. As the immigration officer's notes in
da Silva so tellingly stated, it was ultimately her "impression" concerning
the men's relationship which was decisive. At the very least, a discretionary administrative process, which is so heavily stacked against all visa
applicants, can operate in an unrealistic and unfair manner when addressing claims by same-sex partners.

I1. Same-Sex Partnersand the Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct
I. Sponsoring a "Spouse ", "Common-Law Partner"or "ConjugalPartner"
IRP4 provides that "[a] foreign national may be selected as a member of
the family class on the basis of their relationship as the spouse, commonlaw partner ... or other prescribed family member of a Canadian citizen or
permanent resident."" The IRPRegs provide that -[a] foreign national is a
member of the family class if, with respect to a sponsor, the foreign
national is ... the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner."34 Thus, in addition to a "spouse" or a "common-law partner," a
"conjugal partner" is similarly a member of the family class as an "other
prescribed family member." IRPA then provides that a "Canadian citizen or
permanent resident may ... sponsor a foreign national who is a member of
the family class."" Therefore, the net effect of these provisions is that a
Canadian citizen or permanent resident may now sponsor their spouse,
common-law partner or conjugal partner as a family class immigrant.
"Spouse" is not defined in IRP4 or the IRPRegs and, therefore, has its
common law meaning. "Marriage" is defined in the IRPRegs as, "in
respect of a marriage that took place outside Canada, ... a marriage that is
valid both under the laws of the jurisdiction where it took place and under
Canadian law."36 This definition of "marriage" was motivated by changes
in Dutch law which permitted same-sex couples to marry there as of April
1, 2001.1' (Belgian law has subsequently also permitted same-sex
marriage as of June 1,2003,38 and Massachusetts law did so as of May 17,

33. IRPA, supra note 1,s. 12().
34. IRPRegs, supra note 2, s. 117(l )(a),
35. IRPA, supra note 1,s. 13(I).
36. IRPRegs, supra note 2, s. 2.
37. See Kees Waaldijk, "Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and
Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries" (2004) 38 New Eng. L. Rev. 569.

38. See Aude Fiorini, "New Belgian Law on Same Sex Marriage and Its PIL Implications" (2003)
52 I.C.L.Q 1039.
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2004.") The meaning of"marriage" under Canadian law and, therefore,
the common law definition of "spouse," are currently in flux. Presently,
"marriage" means, in British Columbia and Ontario, pursuant to very
recent decisions of the British Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal,
"the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all
others"4 whereas in all other common law provinces and territories,
"marriage" means "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman
to the exclusion of all others."' Similarly, the Quebec Court of Appeal
held that "homosexuality [was] not ... a valid objection" to a lawful

marriage, thereby permitting legal same-sex marriage.4" Finally, proposed
federal legislation to extend marriage to same-sex partners throughout
Canada has been referred to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its
constitutionality.'
The IRPRegs do, however, define "common-law partner" and "conjugal partner." "Common-law partner" means, "in relation to a person, an
individual who is cohabiting with the person in a conjugal relationship,
having so cohabited for a period of at least one year."4 The IRPRegs
further provide that, in interpreting the definition of "common-law
partner," "an individual Nvho has been in a conjugal relationship with a
person for at least one year but is unable to cohabit with the person, due to
persecution or any form of penal control, shall be considered a commonlaw partner of the person."" "Conjugal partner" means, "in relation to a
sponsor, a foreign national residing outside Canada who is in a conjugal

39. Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass Sup. Ct. 2003). and Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N. E 2d 565 (Mass. Sup. Ct 2004). Significantly, this is
completely different than Baker v. Vermont, 744 A. 2d 864 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1999), in which the Vermont

Supreme Court specifically left the precise determination of remedy to the Legislature, which in turn
enacted "civil unions" (US.. H.B. 847, AnAct Relating to Civil Unions, 1999-2000, Reg. Sess., Vt.,

wleg.state.vt us/docs/2000, acts, act091.htm>).
2000 (enacted), online: Vermont Legislature <,%%,%
40.

Halpern v. Canada (AttorneY General), [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (C.A.) at para. 148, application

by certain intervenors for standing and leave to appeal quashed [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 337. See also
EGALE Canada Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 994 (C.A.), order subse-

quently amended [2003] B.C.J. No. 1582 (C.A.) The government did not seek leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada in either case. GiNen the modem prevalence of divorce, the words "for
life" in the definition of "marriage" are often omitted.
41 . Hvde v Hvde (1866), LR. I P.&D. 130 at 133.
42. Ligue catholique pour les droits de I'homme c. Hendricks, [2004] J.Q. no 2593 (C.A.) at para.

56, dismissing the appeal by the Catholic Civil Rights League from Hendricks c. Qu~bec (Procureur
geOneral), [2002] J.Q. no 3816 (C.S.) [translated by author].
43.

Proposal for an Act respecting certain aspects of legal capaci

,

for marriage for civil pur-

poses, P.C. 2003-1055, online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2003/
doc_30946.html>; and Reference re legal capacity for marriage, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 325.
44. IRPRegs, supra note 2, s. 1(1).

45.

Ibid.. s. 1(2).
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relationship with the sponsor and has been in that relationship for a period
of at least one year."4" To date, there have been no reported cases interpreting the definitions of "common-law partner" or "conjugal partner" set out
in the IRPRegs. The critical expression, "conjugal relationship," in the
definitions of "common-law partner" and "conjugal partner," is not
defined in IRPA or the IRPRegs and, therefore, has its meaning at common
law. There is clear, albeit very flexible, case law defining a "conjugal relationship." The leading case is a 1980 Ontario District Court decision,
Molodowich v Penttinen," in which Kurisko, D.C.J. listed a series of
questions grouped under "seven descriptive components" which offered
guidance as to whether a personal relationship was "conjugal." He emphasized, however, that the extent to which the different elements should be
taken into account had to vary with the circumstances of each case and
emphasized the varying and complex nature of human relationships. His
"seven descriptive components" and questions were as follows:
(1) Shelter:
(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?
(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?
(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?
(2) Sexual and Personal Behaviour:
(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?
(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
(c) What were their feelings toward each other?
(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?
(e) Did they eat their meals together?
(f)What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems
or during illness?
(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?
(3) Services:
What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:
(a) Preparation of meals,
(b) Washing and mending clothes,
(c) Shopping,
(d) Household maintenance,
(e) Any other domestic services?

46,
47.

Ibid, s. 2.
[1980) 0.1. No. 1904, 17 R.FL.(2d) 376 (Dist. Ct.).
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(4) Social:
(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and
community activities?
(b) What wvas the relationship and conduct of each of them towards
members of their respecti%e families and how did such families
behave towards the parties?
(5) Societal:
What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of
them and as a couple?
(6) Support (economic):
(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life
(food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which
both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?
(7) Children:
What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?"
It is settled law that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples may live
in a "conjugal relationship." As Cory, J. stated, for the majority, in M v.H.:
Molodowich tv Penttinen ...sets out the generally accepted characteristics

of a conjugal relationship. They include shared shelter, sexual and personal
behaviour, services, social activ ities, economic support and children, as
well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized
that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are
necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. While it is true
that there may not be any consensus as to the societal perception of samesex couples, there is agreement that same-sex couples share many other
"conjugal" characteristics. In order to come within the definition, neither
opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely
the traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is
"conjugal."
Certainly an opposite-sex couple may, after many years together, be

48.

Ibid at para. 16.
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considered to be in a conjugal relationship although they have neither
children nor sexual relations. Obviously the weight to be accorded the
various elements or factors to be considered in determining whether an
opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and
almost infinitely. The same must hold true of same-sex couples. Courts
haxe Niselv determined that the approach to determine whether a
relationship is conjugal must be flexible. This must be so, for the
relationships of all couples will xar. widely. "
Nowhere in IRPA or the IRPRegs is there explicit reference to same-sex
partners. Howexer, the gender-neutral language used in defining
"common-law partner" and "conjugal partner" clearly indicates that
common-law partners and conjugal partners may be either opposite-sex
partners or same-sex partners. This is made explicit in both the Regulatory
Impact .4nalVsis Statement which accompanied the publication of the
IRPRegs and in CIC's Immigration .1Ianual,as considered below.
Finally, the IRPRegs deal with bad faith in the context of family
relationships and provide, in particular, that "no foreign national shall be
considered a spouse, a common-law partner, [or] a conjugal partner ... of
a person if the marriage, common-la\ partnership [or] conjugal partnership ... is not genuine or \\as entered into primarily for the purpose of
acquiring any status or privilege under the Act.""'
2. Why Exact lt' ere "Common-Law Partner"and "ConjugalPartner
Added to the Family Class "
In the Regulator' Impact Analysis Statement which accompanied the publication of the IRPRegs, the federal government stated that the purpose of
adding "common-law partner" and "conjugal partner" to "spouse" in the
family class was to "ensure consistency with the [Canadian] Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and the intent of the Modernization of Benefits and
ObligationsACt. ' '5 'The reference to meeting Charter muster was undoubtedly intended to take into account Supreme Court of Canada decisions
concerning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. First, in 1995,
in Egan v. Canada,52 the Court unanimously held that sexual orientation
was an analogous ground under the equality guarantees of section 15 of
the Charter and that, therefore, discrimination on the basis of sexual

49

Supra note 9 at paras. 59-60. For a recent example of a determination whether a same-sex

couple were in a "conjugal relationship," see R R v C.R., [2003] O.J. No. 2366 (Sup. Ct. J.).
50. IRPRegs, supra note 2, s 4. With respect to excluded relationships more generally, see also
ibid., ss. 5, 117(9).
St. Supra note 6 at 258.
52. [199512 S C.R 513, 124 D.L.R.(4th) 609.
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orientation was unconstitutional. Secondly, in 1999, an eight-Justice
majority of the Court held, in A. v.H.," that the definition of "spouse"
applicable to partner support in Ontario's Family Law Acts 4 was unconstitutional because it included unmarried opposite-sex partners but not samesex partners. In response to A. v H., the federal government in 2000
enacted the .tfodernization of Benefits and Obligations Act,55 which
amended most, but not quite all, federal legislation to extend benefits and
obligations to same-sex partners on the same basis as they were extended
to unmarried opposite-sex partners and, additionally, going farther than
was required by Af x- H., to extend to both same-sex partners and unmarried opposite-sex partners certain benefits and obligations which had
previously applied only to married spouses. 5 The Mlodernization of
Benefits and Obligations Act did not amend immigration legislation since
the process of replacing the former Immigration Act with new legislation
was already .Nell underway at the time.
The government's perfectly laudable, but very general, statement about
consistency wvith the Charterand the intent of the Modernization of Benefits and ObligationsAct becomes more complicated when one, first, takes
a closer look at other passages in the Regulator' Impact Analysis Statement, and secondly, compares the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement
which accompanied the final version of the IRPRegs wvith the Regulatory
Impact Analysis Statement which accompanied the proposed version of
the IRPRegs six months earlier,' and, thirdly, critically compares the
English and French versions of the two Statements.
The following passages of the Regulatori' Impact Analysis Statement
which accompanied the IRPRegs in their final form - published on June
14, 2002, that is, twvo weeks before IRP4 and the IRPRegs came into force
- are relevant (the emphasis is mine):

53.

Supra note 8.

54.

R.S.O. 1990, c. F3, s. 29.

55. Supra note 6.
56. See, Donald G. Casswell, "Moving Toward Same-Sex Marriage" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 810
at 817-818.
57. Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 2001.1.4477 at 4537.
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What has changed
For common-law partners, the
Regulations:

Nature des modifications
Dans le cas des conjoints de fait, les
dispositions r~glementaires:

-

add the words "and common-law
partner" where the term "'spouse"
appears, to ensure equal treatment
and considerationof common-law
partners, including those in a same
sc' relationship

font suivre toutes les mentions du
terme ,<poux, des mots ,et le conjoint
de fait), pour que les dispositions qui
concernent les poux s 'appliquent
cgalement au-c conjoints defait. y
compris 6 ceux qui vivent une relation
homosexuelle

Benefits
A mending definitions under the
family class provides for equal
treatment under the law for commonlaw couples of the same or opposite
sex by expanding the family class to
include the term "common-law
partner" or "conjugal partners".

Avantages
L'ajout du ((conjoint de fait> ou du
,partenaire conjugal> dans les
nouvelles definitions de la cat~gorie du
regroupement familial permet d'assurer
un traitement cgal sous le rcgime de la
Loi aux couples defait de meme sexe
ou de sexe oppos .

These provisions enable the
sponsorship of a common-law
partner or a conjugal partner, which
may include sponsorship of a partner
of the same sex. The changes ensure
consistency with the Charterof
Rights and Freedoms and the intent
of the Modernization of Benefits and
ObligationsAct.

Ces dispositions r~glementaires
autorisent a parrainer un conjoint de
fait ou un partenaire conjugaux, lequel
peut tre un conjoint de mme sexe.
Les modifications apport~es permettent
de se conformer d la Charte des droits
et liberts et au but poursuivi par la Loi
sur la modernisation de certains
r~gimes d 'avantageset d'obligations.

Compliance and Enforcement
The principal applicant, and any
dependants, must meet all applicable
immigration requirements to be
granted an immigrant visa. These
requirements include, among others,
that they satisfy the officer that they
meet the definition as members of the
family class and that a genuine
relationship exists between them and
the sponsor.

Respect et exicution
Le demandeur principal et les
personnes i sa charge doivent satisfaire
A toutes les exigences d'immigration
applicables pour obtenir un visa
d'immigrant. Ils doivent entre autres
convaincre l'agent qu'ils satisfont aux
exigences 6tablies pour faire partie de
la categorie regroupement familial>
et qu'il existe une relation v6ritable
entre eux et le r6pondant.
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The following passages of the Rcgulator, Impact AnalYsis Statement which
accompanied the proposed version of the IRPRegs - published on December 15, 2001 - are also relevant (again, the emphasis is mine):

What has changed
For common-law partners, the
Regulations:

-add

the wxords "'and common-la\

partner" where the term "spouse"
appears, so that all provisions
applicableto spouses are applicable
to common-law partners

Nature des modifications

Dans le cas des conjoints de fait, les
dispositions reglementaires:

- font suivre toutes les mentions du
terme <<poux des mots <et le
conjoint de fait), pour que les
dispositions qui concernent les poux
s 'appliquentegalement aux conjoints
de fait ....

The Regulator" Impact Analysis Statement which accompanied the final

version of the IRPRegs leaves it unclear whether the addition of "commonlaw partner" and "conjugal partner" to "spouse" in the family class was
intended to ensure equal treatment of unmarried opposite-sex partners and
same-sex partners with spouses, or only to ensure that unmarried opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners were treated equally. Consider, in
particular, the phrases, "to ensure equal treatment and consideration of
common-law partners, including those in a same sex [sic] relationship"
and "[a]mending definitions under the family class provides for equal treatment under the law for common-law couples of the same or opposite sex".
One of these phrases in its French version appears to suggest that only the
more limited initiative was intended: "permet d'assurer un traitement 6gal
sous le regime de Ia Loi aux couples de fait de mme sexe ou de sexe
oppos6". However, on the other hand, the French version of the other key
passage indicates, at least to me, that the legislative intent was to treat all
of spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners equally: "[d]ans
le cas des conjoints de fait, les dispositions reglementaires ...
font suivre
toutes les mentions du terme (epoux" des mots <et le conjoint de fait,
pour que les dispositionsqui concernent les poux s 'appliquent galement
aux conjoints de fait, y compris A ceux qui vivent une relation

homosexuelle" (emphasis mine). As an alternative to the government
translator's English version of this passage, I suggest that the emphasized
words translate into English as, "in order that provisions concerning spouses
apply equally to common-law partners." This translation would certainly
accord more closely with the English version of this phrase in the earlier
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Statement which accompanied the proposed IRPRegs, which read, "so that
all provisions applicable to spouses are applicable to common-law partners".
The differences between the two Statements and between the English
and French texts of each Statement suggest that the government had difficulty deciding exactly what it intended to achieve by adding "commonla\\ partner" and "conjugal partner" to "spouse" in the family class. In
particular, did it intend to treat spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners equally, or only treat unmarried opposite-sex partners and samesex partners, that is, all common-law partners, equally, leaving spouses in
a privileged position? In other words, did it intend the changes to family
class immigration law only to comply narrowly with M. v. H. or did it
intend to go beyond M. v H., as it had done in the Modernization of Ben-

efits and Obligations Act with respect to almost all other federal legislation, and amend immigration legislation to treat all spouses, unmarried
opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners equally?
Despite the ambiguous language in the two Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements and the resulting uncertainty concerning the government's
precise intent in adding "common-law partner" and "conjugal partner" to
the family class, I prefer to take the generous and optimistic approach to
the construction of IRPA and the IRPRegs as having been intended to treat
all spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners equally and, by
implication, to treat heterosexuals, lesbians and gay men equally. This is
the only interpretation consistent with "the intent of the Modernization of
Benefits and Obligations Act", given that that Act, as mentioned above,

went beyond what was required to meet Chartermuster as determined in
M. v H., and extended to same-sex partners and unmarried opposite-sex
partners certain benefits and obligations which had previously applied only
to spouses.
3. How the New Legislation is Applied

CIC publishes and makes available to the public an Immigration Manual.58
Unlike IRPA and the IRPRegs, the Immigration Manual is not law.59

However, the Immigration Manual sets out extremely important "operational provisions" - to use CIC's language - which give visa applicants
and their counsel guidance as to how CIC interprets and applies immigra-

58. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Manuals (October 2003),
CD-ROM, (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada) [Immigration Manual].
59. Cheng v. Canada (Secretarv of State), [ 1994] FC.J. No. 1318, 83 FT.R. 259, 251mm. L.R.(2d)
162 at para. 7 [Cheng].
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tion law. Given the dearth of case decisions concerning same-sex partner
sponsorship, the Immigration Manual is crucial. While the Manual's

operational guidelines ought not to fetter an individual officer's exercise
of their discretion, ' they ought, as one judge has put it:
... to be followed by an Immigration Officer in making a decision so that
ithin the department. Further, the guidelines
some consistency isachieved xN
offer some perspective on the policN of the Immigration Department.6

More recently. the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that delegates must comply with ministerial guidelines.6 2 Further, courts frequently
refer extensively to the Immigration Manual's provisions.6 In this section
I outline the principal provisions of the Immigration Manual concerning
sponsoring a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner.' I then
analyze these provisions and conclude that their effect is to treat same-sex
partners unequally in comparison with opposite-sex partners.
The Immigration Manual groups spouses, common-law partners and
conjugal partners under "conjugal relationships."bS' The Manual states:
The term "'conjugal" was originally used to describe marriage. Over the
years, the term has expanded to describe "marriage-like" relationships,
i.e., common-law opposite-sex couples. More recently the term was
expanded further to describe common-law same-sex couples in the M. v. H.
Supreme Court decision in 1999.
The word "conjugal" does not mean "sexual relations" alone. It signifies
that there is a significant degree of attachment between two partners ...

60.
61.
62.

Yhap, supra note 13.
Cheng, supra note 59 at para. 7 per Cullen, J.
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and lmmigration),[2002] I S.C.R. 3,208 D.L.R.(4th)

1, 18 Imm. L.R.(3d) I at para. 36.
63. As recent examples, see MuJiri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002]
F.C.J. No. 163, 216 F.T.R. 107, 23 Imm. L.R.(3d) 98: and Ha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 1788, 225 F.T.R. 30, 25 Imm. L.R.(3d) 77.

64. See principally Immigration Manual, supra note 58 at OP-2 (Overseas Processing) - Processing Members of the Family Class. I mention that processing of prospective Canadian sponsors is
dealt with in Immigration Manual, IP-2 (Inland Processing) - Processing Applications to Sponsor
Members of the Family Class.
65. Supra note 58 at OP-2, ss. 5.23 (characteristics of conjugal relationships that apply to married,
common-law and conjugal partner relationships), 5.24 (assessment of conjugal relationships).
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The following characteristics should be present in all conjugal
relationships, married and unmarried:
*

mutal commitment to a shared life;

* exclusive - cannot be in more than one conjugal relationship at a
*
*

time;
intimate- commitment to sexual exclusivity;
interdependent - physically, emotionally, financially, socially;

* permanent - long-term, genuine and continuing relationship;
* present themselves as a couple ("here's my other half');
*

regarded by others as partners;

* caring for children together (if there are children).'

The Immigration Manual indicates that "these elements may be present in
varying degrees and not all are necessary for a relationship to be bona
fide," "[xvhether an element is present may depend on the culture or
preferences of the couple," and "[o]fficers should also take into account to
what extent the laws and/or traditions of the applicant's home country may
discourage the parties from openly admitting the existence of the relationship."'- The Manual instructs officers that "[p]ersons who entered into a
marriage, common-law relationship [or] conjugal partnership ... in order
[to] obtain permanent residence in Canada," that is, who entered into
"relationships of convenience," must be refused visas.6 The Manual lists
factors that may be considered by officers in identifying a relationship of
convenience, stating that these factors "are common to marriage,
common-law relationships and conjugal partner relationships."69 The
Manual also deals with situations in wvhich partners have been separated,
stating that, "[flor common-law relationships (and marriage), the longer
the period of separation without any cohabitation, the more difficult it is to
establish that the common-law relationship (or marriage) still exists."'"

In addition to its provisions dealing with spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners collectively under "conjugal relationships," the
Immigration Manual also contains a number of provisions which deal separately with each of spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners.
The Immigration Manual states that a "spouse" is "a married person"'"
and defines a "marriage in Canada" as follows:

66. Ibid, s. 5.22 [emphasis in original].
67. Ibid., s. 5.23.
68.

Ibid., s. 5.14,

69.
70.

Ibid, s. 12.
Ibid., s. 5.34.

71.

Ibid, s. 6.
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A marriage in Canadian law is "'the union of one man and one woman to
the exclusion of all others."
A marriage must be legal both in the country where the couple got married
and under Canadian federal law i.e. the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees
Act) %N
ith respect to consanguinity and the Criminal Code with respect to
polygamy and bigamy.-"
Under the title "'Foreign common-law registrations and same-sex marriages," the Mfanual states:
Some countries allow civ il registrations of common-law same-sex and/or
common-lax opposite-sex partners. The Netherlands is the only
jurisdiction that allows marriage for same-sex couples.
Marriages between people of the same sex are legal in some jurisdictions;
however, such marriages are recognized for purposes of that particular
jurisdiction only. These partners are not recognized as spouses in Canadian
law. They may. however, be recognized as common-law partners and be
processed as members of the family class, provided they meet the definition
of common-law partner.... If they have not been able to cohabit for one
year, the foreign national partner maN apply as a conjugal partner provided
they have maintained a conjugal relationship for at least one year.73
As mentioned above, Belgium and Massachusetts now also have legal samesex marriage. The Manual's statements concerning marriage were dated
"03-2003," that is, before the recent same-sex marriage court decisions in
British Columbia and Ontario referred to above. The Manual further states
that a marriage by proxy, a marriage by telephone, a tribal marriage or a
customary marriage may be a legal marriage if the law of the country in
which the marriage occurred permits such marriages. 4 The Manual further sets out "[f]actors specific to a marriage of convenience" to assist
officers in identifying a marriage of convenience."
The Immigration Manual defines a "common-law partner" as follows:
A common-law partner means a person who is cohabiting in a conjugal
relationship with another person, having so cohabited for a period of at

72.
73.

Ibid.
Ibid., s. 5.38.

74. Ibid.,
s. 6 ("proxy marriage," "telephone marriage" and "tribal marriage").
75. Ibid.,
s. 12.1.
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least one-year. "Common-law partner" refers to both opposite-sex and
same-sex couples.76

Under the heading "How can someone in Canada sponsor a commonlaxx partner from outside Canada when the definition says 'is cohabiting'?",
the AManual states:
According to case law, the definition of common-law partner should be
read as "an individual who is (ordinarily) cohabiting". After the one year
period of cohabitation has been established, the partners may live apart
for periods of timex%ithout legally breaking the cohabitation. For example,
a couple may have been separated due to armed conflict, illness of a family
member, or for employment or education-related reasons, and therefore
do not cohabit at present. Despite the break in cohabitation, a commonlaw relationship exists if the couple has cohabited in a conjugal relationship
in the past for at least one year and intend to do so again as soon as possible.
There should be ex idence demonstrating that both parties are continuing
the relationship, such as vrisits, correspondence, and telephone calls.
This situation is similar to a marriage where the parties are temporarily
separated or not cohabiting for a Nariety of reasons, but still [consider]
themselves to be married and living in a conjugal relationship with their
spouse with the intention of living together as soon as possible.77

The Manual then instructs officers as follows on how to recognize a common-law relationship:
A common-law relationship is fact-based and exists from the day in which
two individuals demonstrate that the relationship exists on the basis of
the facts. The onus is on the applicants to prove that they are in a conjugal
relationship and that they are cohabiting.
A common-law relationship is legally a de facto relationship, meaning
that it must be established in each individual case, on the facts. This is in
contrast to a marriage, which is legally a dejure relationship, meaning
78
that it has been established in law.

If the partners have not been able to cohabit due to persecution or any form
of penal control, the Manual identifies types of evidence which officers

76.

Ibid., s. 6.

77.
78

Ibid., s 5.34.
Ibid., s. 5.32.
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may consider in determining whether a common-law partnership exists.79
Considerable emphasis is put on documentary evidence such as
photographs, airline tickets, visas, visa denials, long distance telephone
bills, testaments and life insurance policies. Finally, the Manual lists
factors that may be considered b\ officers when assessing a common-law
relationship to determine whether it is a "common-law partnership of

convenience. " "
The Immigration Manual defines a "conjugal partner" as follows:
A conjugal partner means, in relation to a sponsor, a foreign national
residing outside Canada who is in a conjugal relationship with the sponsor
and has been in that relationship for a period of at least one year. A conjugal
partner can be in an opposite-sex or same-sex relationship."'
The Manual states that "[c]onjugal partners are similar to common-law
partners; however. they ha%e not yet merged their households to the same
extent, as they have not been able to cohabit continuously and permanently" and, therefore, "conjugal partner relationships are more challenging to assess than common-law relationships. " " Nevertheless, "they must
have established a long-standing, interdependent attachment and have
combined their affairs to the extent possible."' Again, the Manual puts
considerable emphasis on documentary evidence such as airline tickets,
receipts from vacations, visas, visa denials, passports, leave forms from
work, letters, and records of long distance calls and other communication.
Finally, the Manual indicates how officers should strive to identify a
"conjugal partner relationship of convenience." 4 Officers are instructed
that the factors set out with respect to identifying a "common-law partnership of convenience" are relevant except that conjugal partners have been
unable to cohabit. The Manualaddresses the inability of conjugal partners
to cohabit as follows:
As conjugal partners have been unable to cohabit continuously for one
year, officers should focus on the genuineness of the relationship and the
evidence of interdependence, mutual commitment and exclusivity ...

79.

Ibid., s. 5.41.

80.
81.

Ibid., s. 12.2.
Ibid., s. 6 [emphasis in original].

82.

Ibid., s. 5.43.

83.
84.

Ibid.
Ibid., s. 12.3.
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Although cohabitation is not a requirement, visa officers should consider
the amount of time the partners have spent together. Another factor to
consider is whether the partners have attempted to obtain visas to visit
one another or to immigrate to one another's countries. A claim that a
conjugal relationship exists without much ex idence of time spent together
may suggest a relationship of convenience."
I now turn to a critical analysis of the provisions ofthe Immigration Manual.
Whether the foreign national partner and the prospective Canadian
sponsor partner are spouses, common-law partners or conjugal partners,
they must satisfy two requirements before a visa will be issued to the
foreign national partner as a member of the family class. First, they must
establish the existence of their relationship. That is, they must establish
that they are spouses, common-law partners or conjugal partners. Secondly,
they must establish that their relationship is genuine and was not entered
into primarily for the purpose of obtaining a visa for the foreign national
partner. In CIC's terminology, their relationship must not be a "relationship of convenience."
Opposite-sex partners generally have the option of marrying, whereas
same-sex partners generally do not. As the Immigration Manual correctly
states, whether the parties are married, that is, whether they are spouses, is
a question of law. Their marriage must be valid under Canadian law and, if
the marriage took place outside Canada, under the law of the country where
the marriage took place as well. The legal determination whether the partners are married may involve complex questions including, in particular,
difficult conflict of laws issues. However, establishing as a matter of law
whether a valid marriage exists is relatively straightforward, in comparison to the hurdles non-spouse partners must clear in establishing the existence of either a common-law partnership or a conjugal partnership. As
indicated above, opposite-sex partners can even marry by proxy or by
telephone if such a procedure can lawfully create a marriage in the country
where it takes place. I emphasize that I do not have any problem with
recognizing such marriages, but rather refer to such options merely to show
the flexibility available in recognizing the validity of marriages.
In contrast, establishing the existence of a common-law partnership or
a conjugal partnership is, as correctly stated in the ImmigrationManual, a
question of fact. In particular, common-law partners and conjugal partners
must establish as a prerequisite that their relationship is a "conjugal
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relationship." The partners must be assessed against the list of detailed,
and often very intrusive, factors identified in the Immigration Manual as
characterizing a "conjugal relationship." In particular, despite the apparent flexibility in assessing whether a relationship is a conjugal relationship, the Immigration Manual places significant weight on documentary
evidence. In some cases it will be difficult, if not impossible, for
common-law partners or conjugal partners to muster much, if any, such
documentary evidence. Establishing the existence of their relationship
may be particularly difficult for conjugal partners. As considered above,
the Immigration Mfanual recognizes that cohabitation is not a prerequisite
to establishing the existence of a conjugal partnership, but visa officers are
nevertheless instructed to "consider the amount of time the partners have
spent together." 6 In short, the burden on common-law partners or conjugal partners to establish, as a matter of fact, the existence of their relationship is inherently more complex and difficult than is the burden on spouses
to establish, as a matter of law, the existence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the Immigration Manual elides the distinction between
establishing the existence of a marriage and establishing the existence of a
common-law partnership or a conjugal partnership. In particular, the
Immigration Manual states that the requirements of a "conjugal relationship" apply to all spouses, common-law partners and conjugal partners.
This gives the appearance that all these relationships are established on the
same basis, when in fact they are not. The Manual therefore effectively
misleads. While a marriage is certainly a conjugal relationship, spouses
need not satisfy any factual criteria, factors, or elements of a conjugal relationship to be parties to a valid marriage. Instead, they must simply
establish that their marriage is valid under both Canadian law and, if the
marriage was performed outside Canada, according to the law of the jurisdiction where they were married. In particular, as examples, spouses need
not establish that they own property together, have joint loan agreements,
pool their financial resources, offer evidence of airline tickets, long
distance records, and other documentary evidence, or otherwise have their
intimate and personal life examined in detail. 7 The elision of the distinction between marriage and common-law partnership or conjugal partnership is unfortunate since it creates the illusion of equal treatment of spouses,
common-law partners and conjugal partners with respect to establishing

86. Ibid.
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the existence of their relationship. One might reasonably conclude that the
provisions of the Manual suggesting that spouses, common-law partners
and conjugal partners must all satisfy the same conjugal relationship
criteria in order to establish the existence of their relationship are a rather
self-serving attempt on the part of CIC and, therefore, the federal government, to make it appear that spouses, common-law partners and conjugal
partners are treated equally when in fact they are not. However, as already
indicated, CIC explicitly recognizes this crucial distinction in the Immigration Manual itself when it states that a common-law relationship and a
conjugal relationship are defacto relationships whereas a marriage is a de
jure relationship.
In summary, the assertions in the Immigration Manual that all
marriages, common-law partnerships and conjugal partnerships are
"conjugal relationships," and that the same factors and criteria apply to
determining the existence of these relationships, leave the impression that
establishing the existence of a marriage is as difficult as establishing the
existence of a common-law partnership or a conjugal partnership. Clearly
this is not the case.
Similarly, the Immigration Manual suggests that for both commonlaw relationships and marriages, the longer the partners are separated without any cohabitation, the more difficult it will be for them to establish that
the common-law relationship or marriage still exists.88 Again, this is clearly
inaccurate. A marriage is terminated only by death, divorce or annulment.
A marriage is not terminated by the partners living separate and apart,
regardless of for how long. Again, the Immigration Manual elides the
differences between a marriage on the one hand and a common-law partnership or a conjugal partnership on the other hand. The Manual creates
the erroneous impression that the criteria considered to determine the
existence of the relationship are applied equally to spouses, common-law
partners and conjugal partners. By extension, the appearance is created
that heterosexuals, lesbians and gay men are treated equally when in fact
this is not the case.
Some aspects of the Immigration Manual's criteria for establishing the
existence of a marriage might be relevant with respect to the issue of whether
the marriage is genuine. However, all of the foregoing provisions in the
Manual appear in sections dealing with establishing the existence of the
relationship. The misclassification of considerations that are relevant with
respect to determining whether a marriage is genuine by putting them into
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sections dealing with the existence of the relationship, deepens the
misleading effect of the Manual. I emphasize that there is nothing in the
Immigration M1anual to suggest that spouses do not face the same hurdles
with respect to the second criterion, that is, whether their relationship is
genuine, as do common-law partners or conjugal partners. In particular, I
do not suggest that, in practice, spouses typically have an "easy time"
obtaining the foreign national spouse's permanent resident visa or that
common-law partners and conjugal partners always have a "harder time."
Indeed, a forebodingly large number of cases decided since IRPA and the
IRPRegs came into force indicates the contrary: many married couples
have found their marriages deemed not to be genuine and, therefore, their
sponsorship applications denied."
Thus, the problems associated with admission of same-sex partners for
..compassionate and humanitarian considerations" under the former Immigration Act and Regulations, as illustrated by da Silva and Rodriguez, are
just as possible under IRP4 and the IRPRegs. The basis for admission of
"common-law partners" and "'conjugal partners" remains in practice
essentially the same as it previously was under the discretionary "H&C"
approach. Clearly, da Silva and Rodriguez could today encounter exactly
the same potential unfairness under the present system as they could, and
may well have, under the previous sN stem. In particular, they could still be
victims of"subtle homophobia" or an immigration officer who harboured
an undisclosed prejudice against homosexuals.
In short, the Immigration Manual,the federal government's operational
guidelines concerning the application of IRPA and the IRPRegs, do not
achieve the government's ostensible purpose of making immigration law
with respect to partnership sponsorship consistent with the Charter and
the intent of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act. On the
contrary, the Immigration Manualclearly illustrates the lack of equal treatment of same-sex partners in comparison to opposite-sex partners and,
therefore, the lack of equal treatment of lesbians and gay men as compared
with heterosexuals. The difficulties in the Immigration Manual's operational guidelines echo the government's equivocation in the Regulatory
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Impact Ana'sis Statements with respect to what precisely was presumably intended to be accomplished by adding "common-law partner" and
"conjugal partner" to "spouse" in family class immigration. The resulting
inequality is inconsistent with both Charterjurisprudence concerning sexual
orientation discrimination and the approach taken in the Modernization of
Benefits and Obligations Act.

Conclusion: Achieving Equality
The difficulties in the "compassionate and humanitarian considerations"
approach to same-sex partners under the former Act, illustrated by da Silva
and Rodriguez, are still possible under the operational guidelines concerning sponsorship of a common-law partner or conjugal partner under IRPA.
Common-law partners and conjugal partners are not treated equally with
spouses. The result is continuing sexual orientation discrimination contrary to section 15 of the Charter.
There is only one way to achieve equality. All partners, whether samesex or opposite-sex, must be permitted lawfully to marry and therefore be
able to be assessed as spouses."0 This is certainly the direction in which
Canadian law is going. However, even if same-sex marriage were recognized throughout Canada, there would still remain the problem of samesex partners not generally being able to marry in other countries. To date,
only the Netherlands, Belgium and Massachusetts have opened legal
marriage to same-sex partners. It would be unreasonable to expect all, most,
or even many countries to extend marriage to same-sex partners anytime
soon. In other words, the ideal required to achieve equality may not presently be attainable.
In the meantime, therefore, an interim measure to do as much as possible toward achieving equality is required. If a same-sex couple is unable
to marry before the Canadian partner sponsors their foreign national partner, the government should facilitate the admission of the foreign national
partner as the intended spouse of the Canadian partner. Specifically, the
foreign national partner could be admitted as a \isitor on condition that the

90. Presently, same-sex spouses' immigration visa applications are apparently being kept on hold
by CIC because of the uncertainty in Canadian law concerning same-sex marriage and pending
adoption of operational guidelines with respect to same-sex marriages. However, CIC will process
their applications in the meantime if they apply as common-law partners or conjugal partners. See
Jennifer Pak, "'Same-Sex Marriage and Immigration Don't Go Hand in Hand" Capitalnewsonline
13:1 (26 September 2003), online: Capitalnewsonline <http:/temagami.carleton.ca/jmc/cnews/
26092003/nI .shtml>.
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couple marries in Canada within a specified time." If the foreign national
partner is inadmissible or otherwise does not meet the requirements of
IRPA or the IRPRegs, they may be admitted under a temporary resident
permit - again, on condition that the couple marries in Canada within a
specified time - if an immigration officer "is of the opinion that it is
justified in the circumstances"." Temporary resident permits may be
issued overseas, at a Canadian port of entry or in Canada in order to
"'respond to exceptional circumstances" involving "compelling reasons"."
I submit that a stated intention to marry should be considered exceptional
and compelling justification for issuing a temporary resident permit, and a
permit should only be refused if there is clear evidence of immigration
fraud. This is because the gov'emment's concern with false assertions of an
intention to marry is automatically addressed, since, if the couple does not
marry within the specified time imposed as a condition of admission, the
foreign national would be removable. The legislative mechanism for such
admission already exists and no amendments to IRPA or the IRPRegs would
be required. Thus, IRPA and the IRPRegs, without amendment, can accommodate the changing situation of same-sex couples as the law concerning
same-sex marriage continues to evol e.
In summary, if the Canadian sponsor and their same-sex partner have
already legally married, whether in Canada or outside Canada, the sponsorship application should be assessed as a spouse application. If the partners want to marry, but cannot until the foreign national partner is in Canada,
the admission of the foreign national partner should be facilitated in order
to permit them to marry.

91. IRPRegs, supra note 2, ss. 183, 185, 191-193. See also Immigration Manual, supranote 57 at
OP-I1 (Overseas Processing)- Temporary Residents.
92. IRPA, supra note 1, s. 24; and IRPRegs, supra note 2, ss. 63, 183, 185.
93. Immigration Manual, supra note 57 at OP-20 (Overseas Processing) - Temrporary Resident
Permits, ss. 1, 2, 5.1.
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